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This Article argues that the Supreme Court's use of
originalism is opportunistic because sometimes the Court
relies on it, and sometimes it does not. This inconsistency is
recent decisions with significant
in two
evident
Establishment Clause consequences: Town of Greece v.
Galloway (2014) and Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer
(2017). In Town of Greece, the Supreme Court applied an
originalist analysis to uphold the government's policy of
sponsoring predominantly Christian prayers before town
meetings. In Trinity Lutheran Church, the Supreme Court
failed to conduct an originalistanalysis of direct government
funding to churches before ordering a state to award a cash
The Court's inconsistent
grant to a Christian church.
application-even when dealing with a single clause-raises
the possibility that the Court's use of originalismis based less
on principle than on desired outcomes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Originalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation leaves
much to be desired.' This critique applies to both old and new
versions of the theory. 2 However, I do not propose to add to the
substantial literature enumerating the weaknesses of the theory. 3
Instead, my point is that the Supreme Court's use of originalism is
opportunistic because sometimes the Court relies on it, and
sometimes it does not. Although this reproach has been leveled
against particular Justices' invocation of originalism in some areas of
constitutional law but not in others, 4 my critique is that the Supreme
1.

See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, OriginalismIs Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,

7 (2009) ("Over the years, originalism's critics have argued, among other things:

that the target of the originalist search-be it intent, understanding, or public
meaning-is undiscoverable or (in the case of intent) nonexistent; that
originalism is self-refuting because the original intent or understanding was that
the Constitution ought not to be interpreted in an originalist vein; and that
originalism yields substantively bad outcomes.").
2. See infra notes 40-66 and accompanying text (comparing Old
Originalism and New Originalism).
3. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of
Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 722 n.7 (2013) ("Much originalism takes the form of law
office history. Such work is typically result-oriented, generally ignores recent
scholarly developments in the relevant historiography, and approaches historical
texts in an anachronistic manner."); Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism'sDead
Hand-In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2009) ("As
originalism's jurisprudential critics have emphasized for decades now, the
constitutional order that the theory of originalism produces is plagued by
problems of dead hand control that vitiate its democratic authority."); Calvin
TerBeek, Originalism's Obituary, 2015 UTAH L. REV. ONLAw 29, 30 (2015)
("[O]riginalism is a political project no matter what self-serving stories
originalists want to tell themselves (and others). Lip service can be (and is) paid
to originalism's ostensible objectivity, but this is only to give it the patina of
dispassionate scholarship.").
4. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of 'FaintHearted" Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 13-15 (2006) (noting that Justice
Scalia would sometimes adhere to originalism and sometimes would not, listing
cases where he did not). Andrew Koppelman, meanwhile, has criticized the
originalist analysis of the Establishment Clause by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas as "a remarkable congeries of historical error
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Court as a whole has not adopted a consistent approach to
originalism-even as to a single clause. In particular, the Supreme
Court has been wildly inconsistent in two recent decisions with
significant Establishment Clause consequences: Town of Greece v.
6
Galloway5 and Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer.
Town of Greece v. Galloway, decided in 2014, presented an
Establishment Clause challenge to the town's practice of opening its
7
town meetings with predominantly Christian prayers. The Supreme
Court applied an originalist analysis and deemed the prayer policy
constitutional. 8 The Court upheld the sectarian prayers in large part
by equating the town's prayers to the legislative prayers upheld in
Rather than applying any existing
Marsh v. Chambers.9
Establishment Clause doctrinal test, Marsh essentially held that
because the Congress that wrote and approved the Establishment
Clause hired a government-paid chaplain to open its legislative
sessions with prayer, the Establishment Clause allows legislative
prayers. 10 Because the Town of Greece's prayer program was
sufficiently similar to the one upheld in Marsh, it too survived a
constitutional challenge."
In contrast, three years later, the majority in Trinity Lutheran
Church, Inc. v. Comer failed to examine the original understanding of
taxpayer funding of churches.1 2 Trinity Lutheran Church argued
that Missouri's refusal to award the church a grant violated the Free
Exercise Clause. 13 Missouri defended its denial on establishment
In rejecting the State's justification, the Court
grounds. 14
and
general
in
Clause
Establishment
the
downplayed
disestablishment concerns regarding direct money payments to
churches in particular. 15 The absence of any originalist exploration
of direct cash payments to churches is especially surprising given that

and outright misrepresentation." Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and
the Establishment Clause, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 727, 728 (2009) ('There is a serious
originalist inquiry to be made into the meaning of the Establishment Clause, but
none of the 'originalist' judges on the Court appear to have the slightest interest
in undertaking that inquiry.").

5. 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
6. 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
7. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 573 (acknowledging that "most of the prayer
givers were Christian").
8. See infra Subpart III.A.
9. 463 U.S. 783 (1983); see Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 566-67.
10. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 86-87, 90-94 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Subpart IV.A.
13. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,
2018 (2017).
14. See id. at 2017.
15. See id. at 2022.
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Town of Greece seemed to urge a more originalist approach to all
Establishment Clause questions. 16
Although only three years and one Justice separates these two
cases, 17 the Court's treatment of originalism in its Establishment
Clause analyses is markedly different. The Court's inconsistent
application of originalism-even when dealing with a single clauseraises the possibility that the Court's use of originalism is based less
on principle than on results. Although the Court's originalism is not
consistent, its approval of practices amicable to Christianity is.
Part I offers a very brief primer on the Establishment Clause and
on the theory of originalism. Part II performs a close reading of Town
of Greece. It first examines the originalist reasoning that led the
Court to uphold a predominantly Christian prayer practice. It then
considers how the case might have been decided had the Court relied
on conventional doctrinal tests. Part III turns to Trinity Lutheran
Church. It first reviews the Court's cursory treatment of the
Establishment Clause question presented. It then considers what
various originalist approaches might have made of the challenged
funding.
II. BACKGROUND

A.

The Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause is the first clause in the First
Amendment. It reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion." 18 In an oft-quoted passage, the Supreme
Court, when first applying the Establishment Clause to the states,
wrote: 19

16. See infra Subpart III.A.
17. Justice Gorsuch replaced Justice Scalia in between the two cases. Justice
Scalia died in February 2016. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the
Supreme
Court,
Dies
at
79,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
13,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html.
Justice
Gorsuch was confirmed in April 2017. Ariane de Vogue & Dan Berman, Neil
Gorsuch Confirmed to Supreme Court, CNN (Apr. 7, 2017, 12:17 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/07/politics/neil-gorsuch-senate-vote/index.html.
18. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
19. The Bill of Rights originally applied only to the federal government. See
Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833). The process of applying
amendments to the states is known as incorporation. The Supreme Court
incorporates rights via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Due Process Clause applies to the states and prohibits "any state" from
depriving "any person of life, liberty of property without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The argument is that the "liberty" of the Due Process
Clause includes various rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. See Everson v.
Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1947).
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The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another .... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
20
practice religion.
In another early Establishment Clause case, the Supreme Court
emphasized that the Establishment Clause bars the government from
favoring one religion over another and from favoring religion over its
These principles have been regularly
secular counterpart. 21
22
reinforced in Establishment Clause decisions over the years.
With these restrictions, the Establishment Clause protects three
23
interests: civil society, disfavored religions, and favored religions.
First, limiting government involvement with religion helps keep the
peace because state-established religions have historically led to civil
Second, Establishment Clause limits help
strife, if not war.2 4
religious minorities because the government's preference for some
religions is often the first step toward religious persecution of other
religions. 25 Moreover, as noted by James Madison (the primary
author of the First Amendment), such favoritism creates second-class
citizens of those who do not share the government-endorsed beliefs:
20.
21.

Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("The First Amendment

mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between
religion and nonreligion.").
22. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) ("The
touchstone for our analysis is the principle that the 'First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion."'); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S.
687, 703 (1994) ("[A] principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause [is] that
government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion.");
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 609-10 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) ("Forty-five
years ago, this Court announced a basic principle of constitutional law from
which it has not strayed: the Establishment Clause forbids not only state
practices that 'aid one religion . .. or prefer one religion over another,' but also
those that 'aid all religions."' (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 15)).
23. See infra notes 24-25, 27 and accompanying text.
24. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 640 (1978) ("[A] purpose of the
Establishment Clause is to reduce or eliminate religious divisiveness or strife.");
Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 254 (1968) (Black,
J., dissenting) ("The First Amendment's prohibition against governmental
establishment of religion was written on the assumption that state aid to religion
and religious schools generates discord, disharmony, hatred, and strife among
our people.").
25. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962) ("Another purpose of
the Establishment Clause rested upon an awareness of the historical fact that
governmentally established religions and religious persecutions go hand in
hand.").
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"[i]t degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions
in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority." 26 Third,
the establishment constraints protect the favored religion from
corruption and degradation. 2 7 In fact, Thomas Jefferson's famous
description of the Establishment Clause as creating "a wall of
separation between church and state" 2 8 originated with Puritan
minister Roger Williams, who worried that a "gap in the hedge or wall
of Separation between the Garden of the Church and the Wildernes
[sic] of the world" would enable the "wild" world to sully the "garden"
of the church. 29
As for Establishment Clause doctrine, the Supreme Court has
used multiple tests, including but not limited to the Lemon test, the
endorsement test, a coercion test, and an originalist history-andtradition test.3 0 For a stretch of time, the Court relied on the Lemon
test, which deemed unconstitutional any government action whose
primary purpose or primary effect was the promotion or favoring of
religion. 3 1 Under the endorsement test, state action runs afoul of the
Establishment Clause if a reasonable person, aware of the context of

26. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments,
[ca.
20
June]
1785,
NAT'L
ARCHIVES
¶
9,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0163
(last visited
Aug. 8, 2019).
27. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 804 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("The third purpose of separation and neutrality is to prevent the
trivialization and degradation of religion by too close an attachment to the organs
of government.").
28. Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury Baptists, LIBR. OF CONG. (Jan. 1, 1802),
https://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html (last visited June 30, 2019).
29. ROGER WILLIAMS, MR. COTTON's LETTER EXAMINED AND ANSWERED
(Reuben Aldridge Guild, ed., 1644), reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF
ROGER WILLIAMS 313, 392 (1963) ("When they [the Church] have opened a gap in
the hedge or wall of Separation between the Garden of the Church and the
Wildernes of the world, God hath ever broke down the wall it selfe, removed the
Candlestick, and made his Garden a Wildernesse, as at this day. And that
therefore if he will ever please to restore his Garden and Paradice again, it must
of necessitie be walled in peculiarly unto himselfe from the world, and that all
that shall be saved out of the world are to be transplanted out of the Wildernes
of the world.. . .").
30. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (describing
the Lemon test); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
780 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing the endorsement test); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992) (describing the coercion test); id. at 632
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the originalist history-and-tradition test).
31. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 ("First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion."). The third prong was
eventually folded into the second. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,
668 (2002).
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the challenged practice, would view it as endorsing religion. 32 In a
coercion analysis, the state violates the Establishment Clause if it
compels participation in a religious exercise-although Justices
disagree on what amounts to coercion 33 and whether coercion is
necessary or merely sufficient. 34 Finally, several Justices have
argued that an originalist reliance upon history and tradition should
be the main framework for determining constitutionality under the
Establishment Clause. 35
B.

Originalism

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion" is not a self-explanatory clause. It needs to be interpreted.
Different approaches to constitutional interpretation argue for
different interpretive guidelines. 36 Originalists believe that the
meaning of the Constitution was fixed at the time of the Founding
and that we should understand the Constitution in the same way as
the founding generation. 37 According to Justice Scalia, who was one
32. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 780 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[Tihe reasonable observer in the endorsement inquiry must be
deemed aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which
the religious display appears.").
33. Compare Lee, 505 U.S. at 594 (majority opinion) ("[T]he government may
no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct

means."), with id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The coercion that was a
hallmark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious
orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.").
34. In Lee v. Weisman, the Court struck down a graduation prayer given by
a rabbi invited by the public school. Id. at 599 (majority opinion). Although
Justice Kennedy was willing to define coercion broadly to include social pressure,
he did not hold-as the concurrence did-that coercion was sufficient but not
necessary. Id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The Court repeatedly has
recognized that a violation of the Establishment Clause is not predicated on
coercion.").
35. See infra Subpart II.B.
36. Living Constitutionalism, for example, argues that while the
constitutional text enshrines certain principles, how we understand and apply

those principles changes over time as our world and our values evolve. See, e.g.,
Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the "Living
Constitution", 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456, 1464 (2001) (describing how under a living
constitution approach, "fidelity to original constitutional principles means that
their scope of application must evolve with the underlying changes in society").
37. See Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 417 (2013) ("[T]he original meaning of the text provides
the law that legal decisionmakers are bound by or ought to follow."); Robert J.
Delahunty & John Yoo, Saving Originalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1103 (2015)
("Originalism in any form seems to depend on the core claims that original public
meaning (or intent) was not only fixed at the time of textual adoption and is still
recoverable but also that, once recovered, original meaning or intent has a
normatively privileged place in constitutional adjudication."); Lawrence B.
Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453,
459-60 (2013) ("[M]embers of the originalist family agree ... meaning is fixed at
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of originalism's main proponents on the Supreme Court, 38 "[t]he line
we must draw between the permissible and the impermissible is one
which accords with history and faithfully reflects the understanding
of the Founding Fathers." 39
Rather than a single unified originalist theory, it is more accurate
to speak of different types of originalism. 40 Scholars divide the
schools of originalism into Old Originalism and New Originalism.41
Old Originalists argue that the intent of the Framers (and later the
Ratifiers) should guide constitutional interpretation.4 2 Because this
intent is fixed in the past (as opposed to changing with the times), 43
this approach will better curtail judicial discretion. 44 That is, by
forcing judges to uncover the objective, fixed meaning of the
Constitution, originalism prevents judges from infusing the
Constitution with their own personal views.4 5 "It would be difficult
to overstate the extent to which the Old Originalism was
characterized by its own proponents as a theory that could constrain
judges and preclude them from reading their own policy preferences-

the time of origin" [and] "constitutional construction should be constrained by the
original meaning of the constitutional text.").
38. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption,
24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 443 (2007) (describing Justice Scalia as "the most
prominent and public popularizer of original meaning originalism").
39. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
40. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J.
239, 244 (2009) ("[O]riginalism ... [is] not a single, coherent, unified theory of
constitutional interpretation, but rather a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional

theories . . . ."); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 599, 599 (2004) ("A number of variations on this basic [originalism] theory
are possible and have been advocated over time.").
41. See Whittington, supra note 40; cf. Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the
New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 719 (2011) ("[There is no magic line of
demarcation between the New and Old Originalism.").
42. Whittington, supra note 40, at 603 ("A final aspect of originalism during
this period was an emphasis on the subjective intentions of the founders.").
43. Colby & Smith, supra note 40, at 242 ("[D]efenses [of originalism]
typically begin by noting that originalism, unlike other approaches to
constitutional interpretation, accords to the Constitution fixed and determinate
meaning.").
44. Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure:A Life
Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REv. 1819, 1845 (2016)
("Constraining judges through text and history was held out to be the theory's
central virtue and objective."); Whittington, supra note 40, at 602 ("By rooting
judges in the firm ground of text, history, well-accepted historical traditions, and
the like, originalists hoped to discipline them.").
45. Colby & Smith, supranote 40, at 243 ("[O]riginalists further contend that
the determinacy ... is essential to constraining judges' ability to impose their
own views under the guise of constitutional interpretation.").
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most importantly, their own preferred unenumerated rights-into
the Constitution." 46
Detractors quickly highlighted the flaws in this initial version of
originalism, 47 such as the impossibility of determining the subjective
intent of a large group of people who died roughly two hundred years
ago. 48 Subjective intent is not easily discerned, 4 9 and the challenge is
even greater with a group whose members may have had different, or
even contrary, intentions.5 0 Moreover, because the Framers lived two
centuries ago, the historical record can be scant, or at least
incomplete 51 and often ambiguous. 5 2 This difficulty is exacerbated
when the specific issue is beyond the experience or imagination of the

46. Colby, supra note 41, at 717; see also Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989) ("Now the main danger in judicial
interpretation of the Constitution-or, for that matter, in judicial interpretation

&

of any law-is that the judges will mistake their own predilections for the law.").
47. Colby, supra note 41, at 718 ("Those outside of the [Old Originalism]
movement buried it in a sea of devastating critiques-critiques that it could not
withstand, at least not without substantially reformulating itself in order to
deflect them.").
48. Id. at 740. This Article does not address the many normative-as
opposed to practical-criticisms of originalism. For example, why should we be
bound by a long-dead generation whose values are so different from ours? See,
e.g., Richard A. Primus, When Should OriginalMeanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 165, 192 (2008) ("[T]he people whom the Constitution governs today played
no role in its adoption. We were not alive. We were not consulted, did not
participate, and did not consent.").
49. See, e.g., Lorianne Updike Toler et al., Pre-"Originalism",36 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 277, 292 (2013) ("Intentionalism, whether that of the Framers,
Ratifiers, or both, was widely criticized as too difficult a science."); Delahunty
Yoo, supra note 37, at 1095 ("First, critics noted the extreme difficulty, or even in
some cases the impossibility, of ascertaining what the original intent of the
framers was. It was argued that evidence of their intentions can be fragmentary,
incomplete, contradictory, or nonexistent.").

50. Barnett, supra note 37, at 412 (describing the "problem of collective
intent" as "[h]ow do you systematically identify what a diverse group of people
thought about any particular issue?"); Colby & Smith, supra note 40, at 248 ("[I]t
is nearly impossible to ascertain a single collective intent of a large group of
individuals, each of whom may have had different intentions.").
51. Steven K. Green, Federalism and the Establishment Clause: A
Reassessment, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 761, 795 (2005) ("[T]he historical record of
any period-the constitutional period being no exception-is always incomplete.
We have only those documents that have survived the ravages of time and have
been transcribed, compiled and published.").
52. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Indeterminacy of HistoricalEvidence, 19
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 437, 437 (1996) ("I view my task in this Article to be
proving that history is indeterminate."). Moreover, most legal scholars are not
trained in history. See Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can Increase Originalism's
Methodological Rigor: Using Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original Language
Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181, 1192 (2017) ("[T]he difficulty of
historical recovery is further compounded by the lack of professional preparation
of lawyers, and therefore of judges, for the necessary historical inquiry.").
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founding generation. 53 All of this uncertainty undermines the Old
Originalists' claim to determinacy-the raison d'6tre for their
theory. 54 Instead, originalism allowed judges to claim objectivity
while still imposing their own personal preferences onto
constitutional law. 55
As criticism of Old Originalism mounted, New Originalism
developed. 56 A major shift from Old to New Originalism was to focus
on original public understanding instead of original private intent.5 7
However, this shift did not solve the indeterminacy problem (and
possibly worsened it): "defining 'original meaning' as 'original
understanding' did not avoid the subjectivity problem; it simply
replaced one subjective inquiry (the intent of the Framers) with
another one (the understanding . .. of the public)."5 8 As a result,
53. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 664-65
(1987) ("[T]he vast majority of contemporary constitutional disputes involve facts,
practices, and problems that were not considered or even dreamt of by the
founders.").
54. See Colby, supra note 41, at 714 ("Originalism was born of a desire to
constrain judges. Judicial constraint was its heart and soul-its raison d'ftre.");
see also Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1919 (2012) ("But one of the central stated
purposes of originalism, and perhaps its chief selling point in the popular press,
is to produce unique and indisputable answers to legal questions in order to
eliminate the possibility of judicial discretion.").
55. See Or Bassok, The Sociological-Legitimacy Difficulty, 26 J.L. & POL.
239, 264-65 (2011) ("Critics of originalism argue that this pretense of objectivity,
determinacy, and constraint is unrealistic, considering the highly indeterminate
and relativistic nature of history as a discipline, which exposes originalism to the
same failing it set out to correct."); see also Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism:
An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Court's Quest for OriginalMeaning, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 217, 279, 284 (2004) ('The results of the study suggest that one of the
principal justifications for originalism-that it will constrain the ability of judges
to impose their own views in the course of decisionmaking-might not be accurate
as a descriptive matter . . .. [T]he results of the study suggest . .. also that
originalism's advantage over other approaches to constitutional interpretation
with respect to its ability to constrain judicial discretion is marginal.").
56. See Colby, supra note 41, at 719-20 ("[T]he theoretical moves from the
Old to the New Originalism [include]: (a) the move from original intent to original
meaning; (b) the move from subjective meaning to objective meaning; (c) the move
from actual to hypothetical understanding; (d) the embrace of standards and
general principles; (e) the embrace of broad levels of generality; (f) the move from
original expected application to original objective principles; (g) the distinction
between interpretation and construction; and (h) the distinction between
normative and semantic originalism.").
57. See Barnett, supra note 37, at 412 ("New Originalism is about identifying
the original public meaning of the Constitution and not the original Framers'
intent.").
58. Colby, supra note 41, at 722-23; see also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note
37, at 1096 ("[A]1though 'public meaning' originalism appeared to correct some of
the defects of 'original intent' originalism, it was open to the objection that, even
in the 1790s, there was great controversy about the public meaning of important
constitutional terms and clauses.").
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many (but not all) New Originalists have insisted on determining not
the actual, original, understanding, but rather a hypothetical
objective understanding of a reasonable person from the era. 5 9
Another shift that many (but not all) New Originalists make is to
move away from "original expected application"-which tries to
pinpoint "how people living at the time the text was adopted would
"original objective
have expected it would be applied"60-to
was cemented
principle
what
discern
is
to
goal
the
principle"-where
in the Constitution. 61 For New Originalists, the point
is not to ask Madison what he would do if he were a Justice on
the Supreme Court hearing the case at issue. The point is to
determine what principle Madison and his contemporaries
adopted, and then to figure out whether and how that principle
applies to the current case. 62
For example, the original expected application of the Equal Protection
Clause to segregated schools would find them constitutional, 63 while
64
applying the original objective principle of racial equality would not.

59. See Colby & Smith, supra note 40, at 254-55 ("[P]roponents do not
concern themselves with how the words of the Constitution were actually
understood by the Framers, the ratifiers, the public, or anyone else, but rather
with how a hypothetical, reasonable person should have understood them.");
Gary Lawson, Delegation and OriginalMeaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002)
("Originalist analysis, at least as practiced by most contemporary originalists, is
not a search for concrete historical understandings held by specific persons.
Rather, it is a hypothetical inquiry that asks how a fully informed public
audience, knowing all that there is to know about the Constitution and the
surrounding world, would understand a particular provision.").
60. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
291, 296 (2007); see also John 0. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original
InterpretivePrinciples as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 379
(2007) ("Using expected applications is particularly important for modern
interpreters, because usage may have changed in dramatic or subtle ways since
the Framers' day. Expected applications are especially useful because they
caution modern interpreters against substituting their own preferred glosses on
meaning for those that would have been widely held at the Framing.").
61. See Whittington, supra note 40, at 610; cf. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra
note 60, at 379 ("Reliance on expected applications is even appropriate in cases
when a constitutional provision is best understood as adopting a general
understanding or principle.").
62. Whittington, supra note 40, at 611.
63. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalismin Practice,87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1192
(2012) ("[R]acially segregated schools remained common throughout the country
even after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore were
likely consistent with the framing-era understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").

64. See id. ("[The response of most originalists to Brown is to condemn
reliance on original expected applications and argue that racial segregation is
inconsistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's textual
commitment to equality. . . .").
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These distinctions reflect only some of the differences between
Old Originalism and New Originalism. 65 Nevertheless, the multiple
strands of originalism generally agree that there is a constitutional
meaning fixed long ago that should guide judicial decision-making,
even if that meaning cannot always provide definitive answers.6 6
These foundational originalist beliefs drove the Supreme Court's
decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway.
III. TOWN OF GREECE V. GALLOWAY
Once a month, Greece, a small town in upstate New York, holds
board meetings for town officials and residents. 67 'Those meetings
(so says the Board itself) are 'the most important part of Town
government."' 6 8 For years, the town had started these government
meetings with a moment of silence. 69 A new supervisor changed the
policy to begin meetings with a prayer given by a "chaplain for the
month."7 0 The town found these volunteer chaplains by calling the
clergy of local congregations.7 1 Almost all gave explicitly Christian

65. See Colby & Smith, supranote 40, at 250 ("The move from original intent
to original meaning exponentially multiplied ... internal disagreement among
originalists."). New Originalists also part ways on: (1) the need for constitutional
construction and not just constitutional interpretation, see Whittington, supra
note 40, at 611 ("Constitutional meaning must be 'constructed' in the absence of
a determinate meaning that we can reasonably discover."); (2) the role of
precedent, see John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling
Originalism and Precedent, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 803, 803 (2009) ("Originalism is
often thought, by both its advocates and its critics, to be inconsistent with
precedent .... This Article challenges this common view of originalism and
argues that nothing in the Constitution forbids judges from following
precedent."); and even (3) the importance of curtailing judicial discretion, see
William Baude, Originalismas a Constrainton Judges, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2213,
2214 (2017) ("[O]riginalist scholars today are much more equivocal about the
importance and nature of constraining judges.").
66. Some New Originalists acknowledge that the original public
understanding, the result of constitutional interpretation, fails to decide specific
questions, at which point constitutional construction comes into play. Barnett,
supra note 37, at 419 ("By adopting the interpretation-construction distinction,
the New Originalism frankly acknowledges that the text of 'this Constitution'
does not provide definitive answers to all cases and controversies that come
before Congress or the courts.").
67. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 624 (2014) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) ("The Board . . always provides an opportunity (called a Public
Forum) for citizens to address local issues and ask for improved services or new
policies ... and it usually hears debate on individual applications from residents
and local businesses to obtain special land-use permits, zoning variances, or other
licenses.").
68. Id.
69. Id. at 570 (majority opinion).
70. Id. at 571.
71. Id. at 571-72.
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prayers. 72 Although town residents Susan Galloway and Linda
Stephens requested that these government-sponsored prayers be
diversified, they remained predominantly Christian. 73 Nevertheless,
relying on an originalist approach to the Establishment Clause, the
74
Had the Court
Supreme Court upheld the town's prayer practice.
employed any other Establishment Clause test, the decision would
75
likely have been different.
A.

The Court's OriginalistAnalysis

The Court's originalist justification for upholding statesponsored Christian prayers proceeded in two steps.7 6 First, the
Court reaffirmed Marsh v. Chambers, an earlier decision that used
originalism to uphold legislative prayers.7 7 Second, the Court held
that the town's prayers were not different in any relevant respect
from Marsh's legislative prayers and therefore were also
constitutional. 78
The heart of Marsh's originalist argument, as summarized by
Town of Greece, is that the same Congress responsible for the
79
Establishment Clause also authorized legislative chaplains.
Because the First Congress saw no Establishment Clause problem
72.

Id.; see also id. at 628 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("[I]n the 18 months before

the record closed, 85% included those references [to 'Jesus,' 'Christ,' 'Your Son,'
or 'the Holy Spirit']. Many prayers contained elaborations of Christian doctrine

or recitations of scripture."); id. at 611-12 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[D]uring the
more than 120 monthly meetings at which prayers were delivered during the

record period (from 1999 to 2010), only four prayers were delivered by nonChristians.").
73. The town invited a few non-Christians immediately after their
complaint, but then reverted back to their all-Christian lineup. See id. at 61112. (Breyer, J. dissenting).
74. As will be discussed, the Supreme Court's originalism is closer to Old

Originalism than New. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
75. See discussion infra Subpart III.B.1-3.
76. While predominantly originalist, the Court did not rely solely on
originalism. For example, the second step considers the coercive effect of the
prayers. See infra Subpart III.B.3.
77. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 570, 575 (majority opinion). The very first
paragraph of Town of Greece makes clear the decision's dependence on Marsh: "It

must be concluded, consistent with the Court's opinion in Marsh v. Chambers

(1983), that no violation of the Constitution has been shown." Id. at 570. The
Court also invokes Marsh at the start of its legal analysis: "In Marsh v.
Chambers ... the Court found no First Amendment violation in the Nebraska
Legislature's practice of opening its sessions with a prayer delivered by a
chaplain paid from state funds." Id. at 575.
78. See id. at 577-85.
79. Id. at 575; see also Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution,
73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 362 (1988) ("The interesting thing about the [Marsh]

opinion is that it is based squarely and exclusively on the historical fact that the
framers of the first amendment did not believe legislative chaplains to violate the
establishment clause.").
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with legislative prayers, neither should the Court.8 0 "That the First
Congress provided for the appointment of chaplains only days after
approving language for the First Amendment demonstrates that the
Framers considered legislative prayer a benign acknowledgment of
religion's role in society." 81 In fact, the Town of Greece Court twice
pointed to the First Congress's appointment of chaplains as proof of
the constitutionality of legislative prayers. 82
Notably, the Court did not articulate the principle that justified
the constitutionality of the prayers. Instead, the Town of Greece
Court held that it is enough if a practice dates to the very framing of
the First Amendment. 83 "[I1t is not necessary to define the precise
boundary of the Establishment Clause where history shows that the
specific practice is permitted." 84 Consequently, "[i]n light of the
unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there can
be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with a
prayer has become part of the [constitutional] fabric of our society." 85
Like the Marsh Court, the Town of Greece Court made two
assumptions in its originalist analysis.
First, it assumed that
Congress would not have approved the chaplaincy program had it
thought government-funded legislative prayers violated the
Establishment Clause. 86
Second, the Court assumed it should

80. McConnell, supra note 79, at 362.
81. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576.
82. Id.; id. at 575 ("[H]istory support[s] the conclusion that legislative
invocations are compatible with the Establishment Clause. The First Congress
made it an early item of business to appoint and pay official chaplains, and both
the House and Senate have maintained the office virtually uninterrupted since
that time.").
83. Note that the Supreme Court uses history in more than one way. Jack
M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
641, 649 (2013) ("[Constitutional scholars] employ many different kinds of
history-not just adoption history-and they use it in many different ways.").
Adoption history is a necessary component of an originalist analysis. As the
Court argued, if the generation that adopted the Establishment Clause
understood it to allow legislative prayers, then the amendment cannot mean
something that prohibits it. Longstanding history-invoking two hundred years
of unbroken history-represents a different use of history. Rather than use
history to uncover a constitutional meaning fixed at a particular time, it looks at
the meaning as accepted over a long period of time, such as the Court's argument
that a reasonable person would understand prayers as a historical traditionpart of the fabric of our society-rather than religious practice. See Town of
Greece, 572 U.S. at 576. Nor is this an exhaustive use of history. See generally
Balkin, supra, at 692-93 (arguing that history might be used for any of eleven
different types of legal justification).
84. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577.
85. Id. at 576 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)).
86. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. 575-76; see also Marsh, 463 U.S. at 814
(Brennan, J., dissenting). In response, the Marsh dissent first noted that not all
of Congress did approve. Id. at 813 ("The Court cannot-and does not-purport
to find a pattern of 'undeviating acceptance."' (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of
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interpret the Establishment Clause vis-h-vis legislative prayers in
exactly the same way as the First Congress did.87 Although the
Marsh dissent questioned both assumptions, 88 the Town of Greece
Court did not revisit these challenges.8 9
After reaffirming Marsh's conclusion, the Court then found that
the Town of Greece prayers were not different enough for that
conclusion to change.90 Even though virtually all of the prayers were
91
Christian (unlike the nondenominational prayers in Marsh),
92
And while
explicitly Christian prayers also date to the Founding.
the town's prayers swept in citizens about to make requests of the
town government (as opposed to the Marsh prayers aimed at the
legislators alone), 93 the Court held that these prayers would not

New York, 397 U.S. 664, 681 (1970))). The Marsh dissent then points out that
politicians-even when they are also Founding Fathers-are not always mindful
of constitutional limits. Id. at 814-15 ("Madison's later views [that legislative
prayers were actually unconstitutional] may not have represented so much a
change of mind as a change of role, from a member of Congress engaged in the
hurley-burley of legislative activity to a detached observer engaged in
unpressured reflection.").
87. Disagreeing, the Marsh dissent argued, "[T]he Court is misguided
because the Constitution is not a static document whose meaning on every detail
is fixed for all time by the life experience of the Framers." Marsh, 463 U.S. at
816; cf. McConnell, supra note 79, at 362 (paraphrasing the Marsh v. Chambers
holding as, "If James Madison and the boys thought legislative chaplains were
okay, who are we to disagree?").
88. See supra notes 86-87 (detailing critiques).
89. For example, although the Town of Greece Court acknowledged the
country's increased religious diversity, it never responded to this change in the
country's religious composition. Instead, the Court referenced the varied prayers
offered in Congress without explaining how they justify the nonvaried prayers in
the Town of Greece. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 579 ("The decidedly Christian
nature of these prayers must not be dismissed as the relic of a time when our
Nation was less pluralistic than it is today. Congress continues to permit its
appointed and visiting chaplains to express themselves in a religious idiom. It
acknowledges our growing diversity not by proscribing sectarian content but by
welcoming ministers of many creeds.").
90. Id. at 577 ("The Court's inquiry, then, must be to determine whether the
prayer practice in the town of Greece fits within the tradition long followed in
Congress and the state legislatures.").
91. Id. ("First, ... [Respondents] argue that Marsh did not approve prayers
containing sectarian language or themes, such as the prayers offered in Greece
that referred to the 'death, resurrection, and ascension of the Savior Jesus
Christ,' and the 'saving sacrifice of Jesus Christ on the cross."'); see also id. at 578
("[Respondents] fault the town for permitting guest chaplains to deliver prayers
that 'use overtly Christian terms' or 'invoke specifics of Christian theology."').
92. Id. ("The Congress that drafted the First Amendment would have been
accustomed to invocations containing explicitly religious themes of the sort
respondents find objectionable.").
93. Id. at 586 ("Respondents argue that the public may feel subtle pressure
to participate in prayers that violate their beliefs in order to please the board
members from whom they are about to seek a favorable ruling. In their view the
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coerce any Greece resident into participating in a religious exercise. 94
After all, a reasonable citizen should understand that Christian
prayers at public proceedings are simply part of our heritage and not
an attempt to pressure them. 95
Despite the many refinements of originalism in academic
scholarship, 96 the Town of Greece Court leaned more toward Old
Originalism than New Originalism. To start, the Court's evidence
centered around the First Congress. 9 7 Because "the First Congress
made it an early item of business to appoint and pay official
chaplains," the Court found that "history support[s] the conclusion
that legislative invocations are compatible with the Establishment
Clause." 9 8

Thus, the Court primarily focused on the intent of the

Congressional Framers rather than the general understanding of the
public, or even the Ratifiers.
Moreover, in Old Originalism fashion, the Court examined the
original expected application (e.g., legislative prayers with Christian
content) rather than articulating the original underlying principle
(e.g., nondivisive religious acknowledgments). 9 9 That is, the Court
reasoned that since the First Congress countenanced legislative

fact that board members in small towns know many of their constituents by name
only increases the pressure to conform.").
94. Id. at 587 ("On the record in this case the Court is not persuaded that the
town of Greece, through the act of offering a brief, solemn, and respectful prayer
to open its monthly meetings, compelled its citizens to engage in a religious
observance.").
95. Id. ("The prayer opportunity in this case must be evaluated against the
backdrop of historical practice. As a practice that has long endured, legislative
prayer has become part of our heritage and tradition, part of our expressive
idiom ... . It is presumed that the reasonable observer is acquainted with this
tradition and understands that its purposes are to lend gravity to public
proceedings and to acknowledge the place religion holds in the lives of many
private citizens, not to afford government an opportunity to proselytize or force
truant constituents into the pews."). Of course, both may be true. Statesponsored public prayers may be simultaneously traditional and coercive so that
part of our heritage is coercing non-Christians to conform.
96. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 41, at 719-20 (describing the shift from Old
Originalism to New Originalism).
97. See, e.g., Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576 ("[T]hat the First Congress
provided for the appointment of chaplains only days after approving language for
the First Amendment demonstrates that the Framers considered legislative
prayer a benign acknowledgment of religion's role in society.").
98. Id. at 575.
99. Andy Koppelman describes this failure to articulate any justifying
principle as follows: 'The argument is essentially, 'I have no idea what this
provision means. But whatever it means, it can't prohibit this, because the
Framers approved of it.' This is a distinctive kind of originalism, and it ought to
have a name. Call it 'I Have No Idea Originalism."' Koppelman, supranote 4, at
737.
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prayers that invoke Jesus Christ, then we today must as well.10 0
Under a New Originalist approach, this original expected application
might be informative but would not be conclusive. 10 1 Instead, a New
Originalism analysis would look for the principle that explained
Congress's acceptance of Christian prayers, such as permitting
invocations that included everyone. Had the Court done so, changes
over time might in fact raise questions: while nondenominational
Christian prayers may have been inclusive during the Founding era,
they no longer are. 102 As the Marsh dissent noted, "our religious
composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than were our
forefathers . . . . In the face of such profound changes, practices which
may have been objectionable to no one in the time of Jefferson and
Madison may today be highly offensive to many persons . . . ."103
Perhaps acknowledging that even the founding generation might
pass unconstitutional laws, 104 the Town of Greece Court suggested
that historical practices on their own should not guarantee
constitutionality: "Marsh must not be understood as permitting a
practice that would amount to a constitutional violation if not for its
historical foundation."10 5 But it is unclear whether the Court took
this caveat seriously. After stating this limit, the Court immediately
continued, "The case teaches instead that the Establishment Clause
must be interpreted 'by reference to historical practices and
understandings."' 1 0 6 Assuming the Court was not contradicting itself,
it is not entirely clear what the Court meant when it argued that

100. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577 ("Marsh stands for the proposition
that it is not necessary to define the precise boundary of the Establishment
Clause where history shows that the specific practice is permitted.").
101. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in JudicialReview:
A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65
1269, 1284 (1997) (arguing that "no reputable
FORDHAM L. REV.

originalist ...

takes the view that the Framers' 'assumptions and expectation

about the correct application' of their principles is controlling" (quoting RONALD
DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION

13 (1996)); cf. Balkin, supra note 60, at 338 ("The original expected application of

the Fourteenth Amendment is not by itself controlling . . . .").
102. Although 70.6 percent of Americans identify as Christian, almost 30
percent do not. This means that significantly more than a quarter of Americans

do not consider themselves Christians.

Religion & Public Life, America's

12, 2015),
(May
Changing Religious Landscape, PEW RES. CTR.
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/.
103. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 817 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
104. Id. at 814-15 ("Legislators, influenced by the passions and exigencies of
the moment, the pressure of constituents and colleagues, and the press of
business, do not always pass sober constitutional judgment on every piece of
legislation they enact, and this must be assumed to be as true of the members of
the First Congress as any other.").
105. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014).

106.

Id.
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historical practicesmust be understood in conjunction with historical
understandings. Might the Court have been advocating for a New
Originalism search for original objective principles (historical
understandings) rather than simply original expected applications
(historical practices)? But then the Court's next sentence seems to
make the Old Originalism point that because the First Congress
appointed chaplains within days of finalizing the First Amendment,
legislative prayers are constitutional.1 0 7 In other words, the Court
proceeded to essentially conflate practices and understandings by
relying on original expected practices (Christian legislative prayers),
to determine original objective understanding (these prayers do not
violate the Establishment Clause).1os Perhaps the Court meant to say
that only the original practices of the Congress directly involved with
drafting the Establishment Clause are relevant to uncovering
original meaning.
If so, then its reliance on the Framers'
understandings more than anyone else's is still very much Old
Originalism rather than New.
Regardless of the ambiguous caveat, what is clear is that the
Court pushed for an originalist approach beyond the specific context
of legislative prayers.
The Marsh dissent characterized the
legislative prayer ruling as "carving out an exception" from its usual
Establishment Clause tests. 109 Although the Town of Greece Court
recognized this characterization, it did not back it. On the contrary,
its language suggests that all Establishment Clause analyses should
be based on historical practices and understanding: "[Marsh]
teaches . . . that the Establishment Clause"-not just legislative
prayers-"must be interpreted 'by reference to historical practices
and understandings."'" 10 Moreover, the Town of Greece Court insisted
107. Id. ("That the First Congress provided for the appointment of chaplains
only days after approving language for the First Amendment demonstrates that
the Framers considered legislative prayer a benign acknowledgment of religion's
role in society.").
108. Cf. Balkin, supra note 38, at 453 ("[T]o use original expected application
to define the scope of constitutional principles so that they produce results that
conform to the original expected application . . is essentially to reinstitute a new
form of expectations originalism under the guise of original meaning."); McGinnis
& Rappaport, supra note 60, at 378 ("[W]hile the original meaning may not be
defined by the expected applications, these applications will often be some of the
best evidence of what that meaning is.").
109. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 813 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575 ("Marsh is sometimes described as 'carving out
an exception' to the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, because it
sustained legislative prayer without subjecting the practice to any of the formal
tests that have traditionally structured this inquiry.").
110. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989) (Kenney, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)); see also id. at 577 ("[I]t is not necessary to define
the precise boundary of the Establishment Clause where history shows that the
specific practice is permitted.").
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that "[a]ny test the Court adopts must acknowledge a practice that
was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the critical scrutiny
of time and political change."111 In sum, the Town of Greece Court
advocated an originalist approach to the Establishment Clause.
B.

Establishment Clause Doctrine Analyses

In his Marsh dissent, Justice Brennan noted that "if the Court
were to judge legislative prayer through the unsentimental eye of our
settled doctrine, it would have to strike it down as a clear violation of
the Establishment Clause." 112 The same holds true for the Town of
Greece's prayers.
1.

Lemon Test

Under the Lemon test, any state action with either a primarily
religious purpose or a primarily religious effect violates the
Establishment Clause. 1 1 3 To argue that the primary purpose or effect
of praying is not religious both blinks at reality and cheapens prayer.
It strains credulity to characterize the primary purpose of
praying to God as anything but religious. As Justice Brennan stated
in his dissent in Marsh, "[t]hat the 'purpose' of legislative prayer is
pre-eminently religious rather than secular seems to me to be selfevident." 114 Prayer is, after all, an inherently religious act. It is
"fundamentally and necessarily religious." 115 In fact, its presence
helps differentiate religious from nonreligious activity: "[i]t is prayer
which distinguishes religious phenomena from all those which
resemble them or lie near to them, from the moral sense, for example,
or aesthetic feeling."11 6 As the Marsh dissent argued, the clergy
offering prayers "are not museum pieces, put on display .... Rather,
they are engaged by the legislature to lead it-as a body-in an act of
117
religious worship."
Both the Marsh and Town of Greece Courts argued that the
prayers serve secular functions, notably "formally opening the
legislative session, getting the members of the body to quiet down,
118
and imbuing them with a sense of seriousness and high purpose."
111. Id. at 577; see also id. ("[T]he line we must draw between the permissible
and impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects the
understanding of the Founding Fathers." (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v.

Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
112. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 796 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
114. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

115. Id. at 810.
116. Id. at 810 (quoting

A. SABATIER, OUTLINES OF A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

25-26 (T. Seed trans., 1957 ed.)).

117.
118.

Id. at 811.
Id. at 797; see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 575 (2014)

("[L]egislative prayer lends gravity to public business, reminds lawmakers to
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Yet these goals could easily be accomplished without religion,11 such
as by reciting the Pledge of Allegiance or observing a moment of
silence-the means used in the Town of Greece before Christian
prayers were introduced.
That the government instead chose
religious means when secular ones were available further confirms
that the purpose was religious.
Because "[p]rayer is religion in act," 120 the primary effect is also
religious. 12 1 Claiming otherwise insults religion. 122 As the Marsh
dissent points out, upholding prayers on the ground that they are not
first and foremost a form of worship is a pyrrhic victory.123
2.

Endorsement Test

Developed by Justice O'Connor after Marsh was decided, the
endorsement test asks whether a reasonable person, aware of the
background and context of a challenged state action, would view it as
endorsing religion. 124
If so, then the state action violates the
Establishment
Clause.1 25
Such
endorsement
contravenes
Establishment Clause principles by creating a caste system based on
religion: 12 6 "government cannot endorse the religious practices and
beliefs of some citizens without sending a clear message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders or less than full members of the
political community." 127

transcend petty differences in pursuit of a higher purpose, and expresses a
common aspiration to a just and peaceful society.").
119. Cf. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797 (Brennan, J., dissenting). ("Moreover,
whatever secular functions legislative prayer might play-formally opening the
legislative session, getting the members of the body to quiet down, and imbuing
them with a sense of seriousness and high purpose-could so plainly be
performed in a purely nonreligious fashion.").
120. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 811 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting SABATIER,
supra note 116, at 25).

121. Id. at 798 ("The 'primary effect' of legislative prayer is also clearly
religious.").
122. Legislative prayers risk "degrading religion by allowing a religious call
to worship to be intermeshed with a secular call to order." Id. at 808.
123. Id. at 811 ("If upholding the practice requires denial of this fact [that
prayers are an act of religious worship], I suspect that many supporters of
legislative prayer would feel that they had been handed a pyrrhic victory.").
124. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he reasonable observer in the endorsement
inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and context of the community and
forum in which the religious display appears.").
125. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594-95 (1989).
126. Id. at 625 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Endorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community.").
127. Id. at 627.
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Because any reasonable person would understand that praying
is primarily a religious act of worship, government sponsorship of
prayer endorses religion. 12 8 Moreover, the Town of Greece did not just
29
As
endorse religion in general but Christianity in particular.1
Justice Kagan noted, this endorsement violates the Establishment
Clause's "norm[s] of religious equality."1 30 If nothing else, the
1
Establishment Clause bars favoring one religion over others. 13 Or to
articulate it as Justice O'Connor might have, state-sponsored
Christian prayers violate the Establishment Clause by sending a
message to non-Christians that they are outsiders and less than full
132
members of the Town of Greece community.
The Town of Greece Court defended the pervasively Christian
prayers on the ground that the town did not intentionally exclude
other religions. 133 The implication is that a reasonable person would
know that the town was mostly Christian and therefore would
understand that the mostly Christian prayers were due to
demographics and not endorsement (and certainly not animus).13 4
But, if this background and context was known by the townspeople,
it was known by the town government as well, meaning the Town of

128. Cf. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 798 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ('To invoke Divine
guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws,' is nothing but a
religious act.").
129. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 611-12 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("[D]uring the more than 120 monthly meetings at which prayers were delivered
during the record period (from 1999 to 2010), only four prayers were delivered by
non-Christians.").
130. Id. at 615-16 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 616 (arguing that the
Christian prayers violate the "[Establishment Clause] promise that every citizen,
irrespective of her religion, owns an equal share in her government").
131. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ("The clearest command of

the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially

preferred over another.").
132. Cf. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community.".
133. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 585-86 (majority opinion) ("That nearly all
of the congregations in town turned out to be Christian does not reflect an
aversion or bias on the part of town leaders against minority faiths. So long as
the town maintains a policy of nondiscrimination, the Constitution does not

require it to search beyond its borders for non-Christian prayer givers in an effort
to achieve religious balancing.").
134. Id. at 573 ("Although most of the prayer givers were Christian, this fact
reflected only the predominantly Christian identity of the town's congregations,
rather than an official policy or practice of discriminating against minority
faiths."); id. at 597 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that failure to reach out to

synagogues just over the town border "was not done with a discriminatory intent.
(I would view this case very differently if the omission of these synagogues were
intentional.)").
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Greece decided to implement prayers while fully aware that they
would virtually all be Christian. 13 5 In any event, even after it became
obvious that Christianity dominated the prayers, and even after
citizens who belonged to religious minorities complained, the town did
not diversify its prayers. "[I]n a context where religious minorities
exist and where more could easily have been done to include their
participation, the town chose to do nothing." 36
Given this
background and context, a reasonable observer could well conclude
that the Town of Greece was endorsing Christianity.
3.

Coercion Test

Under the coercion test, the government violates the
Establishment Clause if it forces someone to participate in a religious
exercise. 137 Although the Town of Greece Court did not use the Lemon
test or the endorsement test, the Court did apply the coercion testalbeit in a limited way. Rather than evaluate whether statesponsored prayers were unconstitutionally coercive, the Court
assumed legislative prayers like those in Marsh were not coercive and
then considered whether anything about the prayers in the Town of
Greece would lead to a contrary conclusion.
In finding that the Christian prayers were not coercive, the Town
of Greece Court downplayed their religious nature, emphasizing their
secular purposes 138 and arguing that the prayers were merely "part
of our heritage and tradition"139-echoing arguments made by the
Marsh Court. It also rejected the claim that the prayers were more
coercive than those in Marsh because they were directed at citizens

135.

To quote Douglas Laycock from another context, the Court argues that

"[Christians] benefitted from demography rather than law. But the demography
was perfectly understood when the law was enacted. . . ." Douglas Laycock,

"Nonpreferential"Aid to Religion: A False Claim About OriginalIntent, 27 WM.

& MARY L. REV. 875, 911 (1986).

136. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 613 (Breyer, J., dissenting). "It could, for
example, have posted its policy of permitting anyone to give an invocation on its
website, greeceny.gov.. . . It could have announced inclusive policies at the
beginning of its board meetings .... It could have provided information to those
houses of worship of all faiths that lie just outside its borders and include citizens
of Greece among their members. Given that the town could easily have made
these or similar efforts but chose not to, the fact that all of the prayers (aside
from the 2008 outliers) were given by adherents of a single religion reflects a lack
of effort to include others." Id.
137. Id. at 586 (majority opinion) ("It is an elemental First Amendment
principle that government may not coerce its citizens 'to support or participate in
any religion or its exercise."' (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 473,
659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
138. Id. at 587 ("It is presumed that the reasonable person . . understands
that its purposes are to lend gravity to public proceedings ....
139. Id.
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about to request a favor from their government. 140 First, the Court
claimed that citizens were not pressured because the prayers were
41
primarily for the benefit of members of the town government.1
Second, the Court argued there was no coercion because the
government never punished anyone for refusing to join in the
prayers.1 42 "Nothing in the record indicates that town leaders
allocated benefits and burdens based on participation in the
prayer."1 43
The analysis could have, and perhaps should have, easily come
out the other way. As discussed earlier, prayers to God are more
accurately described as an act of worship rather than a solemnizing
nod to tradition. Nor is it correct to say they were aimed at the town
44
In
board members when the clergy faced the public, not the board.1
fact, the chaplain of the month "typically addresses those people, as
even the majority observes, as though he is 'directing [his]
congregation."'1

45

In addition, the Court adopted a highly narrow view of coercion,
especially compared to Lee v. Weisman,146 which held that an invited
clergy's nondenominational invocations at a school graduation
violated the Establishment Clause.1 47 In Lee, the Court held that the
government could unconstitutionally coerce people not just by "force
49
of law or threat of penalty,"1 48 but by mobilizing peer pressure.1
"[T]he government may no more use social pressure to enforce
140. Id. at 577 ("Second, ... [Respondents] argue that the setting and conduct
of the town board meetings create social pressures that force nonadherents to
remain in the room or even feign participation in order to avoid offending the
representatives who sponsor the prayer and will vote on matters citizens bring
before the board.").
141. Id. at 587 ("The principal audience for these invocations is not, indeed,
the public but lawmakers themselves."); see also id. at 588 ("To be sure, many
members of the public find these prayers meaningful and wish to join them. But
their purpose is largely to accommodate the spiritual needs of lawmakers and
connect them to a tradition dating to the time of the Framers.").
142. Id. at 589 ("Respondents suggest that constituents might feel pressure to
join the prayers to avoid irritating the officials who would be ruling on their
petitions, but this argument has no evidentiary support.").

143. Id.
144. Id. at 627 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("Contrary to the majority's
characterization, ... the prayers there are directed squarely at the citizens.
Remember that the chaplain of the month stands with his back to the Town
Board; his real audience is the group he is facing-the 10 or so members of the
public, perhaps including children.").
145. Id.
146. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
147. Id. at 593.
148. See id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This was the position favored by
Id. ("The coercion that was a hallmark of historical
the Lee dissenters.
establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial
support by force of law and threat of penalty.").
149. See id. at 593-94 (majority opinion).
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orthodoxy than it may use more direct means."15 0 The Lee Court
understood that social pressure from friends and neighbors can be as
strong as legal pressure. 15 1 This is especially true in small gatherings
where people may know each other. 152 The Town of Greece Court,
however, dismissed this possibility when it concluded that "mature
adults .. . [are] 'presumably' . . . 'not readily susceptible to religious
indoctrination or peer pressure."' 153 In fact, social science has found
just the opposite. 154
For the Town of Greece Court, not only must coercion come via
state penalty, but the penalty must actually be imposed. 15 5 In
rejecting any finding of coercion, the Court repeatedly emphasized
that the town board had never retaliated against anyone who declined
to join the prayers. 156 Yet because many citizens attend town
meetings in order to seek a benefit from the government, 15 7 some may
have felt compelled to join the prayer rather than object and risk

150. Id. at 594.
151. Id. at 593 ("This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as
any overt compulsion.").
152. Id. at 624 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the setting is intimate,
with only "10 or so citizens in attendance").
153. Id. at 590 (majority opinion) (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
792 (1983)). Despite continually pointing out that plaintiffs offered no evidence
that people were pressured to participate, the Court offered no evidence that
adults are completely immune to social pressure.
154. For example, in a classic experiment on conformity, subjects were shown
three lines and asked which best matched a fourth line. When asked with no one
present, 99 percent answered correctly. When asked after several people gave
the wrong answer, 70 percent of the subjects went along with the group at least
once and also gave the wrong answer. SOLOMON E. AsCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
450-59 (1952); see also Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and
Conformity, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS: GEN. & APPLIED 1, 1, 9-24 (1956); Janice

Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 Sup.
CT. REV. 153, 182-83 (2002) ("The influence of the behavior of others can be so

great that people end up responding in a way that every bone in their body is
telling them is wrong, but they do it anyway.").
155. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 588-90.
156. Id. at 589 ("In no instance did town leaders signal disfavor toward
nonparticipants or suggest that their stature in the community was in any way
diminished."); id. at 588 ("The analysis would be different if town board
members . . . singled out dissidents for opprobrium."). In fact, some of the
dissidents were subject to criticism by the state-sponsored clergy. See id. at 629
(Kagan, J., dissenting) ("[When the plaintiffs here began to voice concern over
prayers that excluded some Town residents, one pastor pointedly thanked the
Board '[o]n behalf of all God-fearing people' for holding fast, and another declared
the objectors 'in the minority and . .. ignorant of the history of our country."').
157. Id. at 586 (majority opinion) ("Citizens attend town meetings.. . [to]
petition the board for action that may affect their economic interests, such as the
granting of permits, business licenses, and zoning variance.").
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government retaliation. 158 This government compulsion was not
recognized. In short, those who participated in the prayers in fear of
reprisal (versus those who objected and were punished) seem to fall
outside of the Court's view of coercion.
To summarize, the Supreme Court failed to subject the Town of
Greece's prayer practice to the Lemon test or the endorsement test.
And while it considered coercion, its analysis started with the premise
that government-sponsored legislative prayers like those in Marsh
were not coercive. A thorough application of any of these tests might
have led to the invalidation of the prayers sponsored by the Town of
Greece.
IV. TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH, INC. V. COMER
In contrast to the key role that originalism played in analyzing
the Establishment Clause challenge in Town of Greece, the Supreme
Court made little effort to delve into the original understanding of
taxpayer funding of churches in Trinity Lutheran. Had it done so, the
decision may well have come out differently.
A.

The Court's (Perfunctory)Establishment Clause Analysis

Although Trinity Lutheran Church brought a Free Exercise
Clause claim, the government's defense was establishment-based.
The State of Missouri provided cash reimbursements for playground
While Trinity Lutheran's application for this
improvements.1 5 9
competitive grant scored well on many factors, 160 it did not receive a
grant because the Missouri Constitution banned financial aid to
houses of worship. 161 The church sued, arguing that the State's
162
refusal to give it money violated its Free Exercise Clause rights.
The Supreme Court agreed with the church, rejecting Missouri's
disestablishment justifications. 163
Despite the centrality of the Establishment Clause and
establishment principles to Missouri's defense, 164 the Court's
158. Id. ("Respondents argue that the public may feel subtle pressure to
participate in prayers that violate their beliefs in order to please the board
members from whom they are about to seek a favorable ruling.").
159. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,
2017 (2017) ("The Missouri Department of Natural Resources offers state grants
to help public and private schools, nonprofit daycare centers, and other nonprofit
entities purchase rubber playground surfaces made from recycled tires.").
160. Id. at 2018 ("The Center ranked fifth among the 44 applicants in the 2012
Scrap Tire Program.").
161. Id.; see also Mo. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("[N]o money shall ever be taken from
the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or
denomination of religion.").
162. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2018.
163. Id. at 2022-24.
164. See id. at 2018-20.
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establishment analysis was perfunctory. 165 Without any discussion,
the Court accepted as true the parties' stipulation that the
Establishment Clause would allow the grant. 166 Nonetheless, as
Justice Sotomayor noted in her dissent, "[c]onstitutional questions
are decided by this Court, not the parties' concessions."1 6 7
Moreover, when evaluating Missouri's justification for its
exclusion, the Trinity Lutheran majority barely mentioned original
practices or original understandings.16 8 Missouri's reluctance to
directly fund churches has a long lineage, as described in Locke v.
Davey,16 9 another case involving a free exercise challenge to a state
that declined to fund religion. 170 In Locke, Washington State offered
scholarship grants to college students1 71 but denied them to
otherwise-qualified applicants who wanted to train for the
ministry. 1 7 2
Like Missouri, Washington had a constitutional
provision barring financial aid to religious institutions. 1 7 3
In upholding Washington's decision, the Locke Court looked to
historical understandings, noting that Washington's establishment
concerns were "scarcely novel" 174 and that "we can think of few areas
in which a State's antiestablishment interests come more into play.
Since the founding of our country, there have been popular uprisings
against procuring taxpayer funds to support church leaders, which
was one of the hallmarks of an 'established' religion." 175 The Locke
Court then described how "[m]ost States that sought to avoid an
establishment of religion around the time of the founding placed in

165. See id. at 2019-21.
166. Id. at 2019 ("The parties agree that the Establishment Clause of that
Amendment does not prevent Missouri from including Trinity Lutheran in the
Scrap Tire Program.").
167. Id. at 2028 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
168. See generally id. at 2017-25 (majority opinion).
169. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
170. Id. at 718.
171. Id. at 715 ("The State of Washington established the Promise
Scholarship Program to assist academically gifted students with postsecondary
education expenses.").
172. Id. ("In accordance with the State Constitution, students may not use the
scholarship at an institution where they are pursuing a degree in devotional
theology."); id. at 716 ("A 'degree in theology' is not defined in the statute, but, as
both parties concede, the statute simply codifies the State's constitutional
prohibition on providing funds to students to pursue degrees that are 'devotional
in nature or designed to induce religious faith."').
173. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("No public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or
the support of any religious establishment.").
174. Locke, 540 U.S. at 722.

175. Id.
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their constitutions formal prohibitions against using tax funds to
support the ministry" 176 and listed each constitutional provision.1 7 7
The Trinity Lutheran Court's engagement with this originalist
It acknowledged Locke's reliance on the
analysis is minimal.
historical "antiestablishment interest in not using taxpayer funds to
pay for the training of clergy." 178 But it distinguished Locke by
arguing that Locke was about funding clergy, while Trinity Lutheran
was about funding playgrounds. 179 The Trinity Lutheran Court did
not ask what original practices or original understandings might
suggest about direct funding to churches, church schools, or even
church playgrounds. Instead, the Court characterized the State's
disestablishment principles as "nothing more" than a "policy
18 0

preference."

Indeed, not only did the Trinity Lutheran Court mostly ignore
religion clause history, it sometimes seemed to reject an originalist
approach altogether. Under an originalist approach, a law with roots
deep in the founding era should start with a presumption of approval
if not constitutionality. 18 1 Yet the Trinity Lutheran Court ratified a

Free Exercise Clause decision that invalidated a Tennessee law
dating to the Founding. 182 The Court noted that "Tennessee had
disqualified ministers from serving as legislators since the adoption
of its first Constitution in 1796, and . .. a number of early States had

176.
177.

Id. at 723.

Id. ("E.g., GA. CONST., art. IV, § 5 (1789), reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 789 (F.
-

Thorpe ed. 1909) (reprinted 1993) ('All persons shall have the free exercise of
religion, without being obliged to contribute to the support of any religious
profession but their own'); PA. CONST., art. 11 (1776), in 5 id., at 3082 ('[N]o man
ought or of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or

support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against,

his own free will and consent'); N.J. CONST., art. XVIII (1776), in id., at 2597
(similar); DEL. CONST., art. I, § 1 (1792), in 1 id., at 568 (similar); KY. CONST., art.
XII, § 3 (1792), in 3 id., at 1274 (similar); VT. CONST., Ch. I, art. 3 (1793), in 6 id.,
at 3762 (similar); TENN. CONST., art. XI, § 3 (1796), in id., at 3422 (similar); OHIO
CONST., art. VIII, § 3 (1802), in 5 id., at 2910 (similar).").
178. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,
2023 (2017).
179. Id. (describing funding in Locke as "funding to support church leaders,"
which "lay at the historic core of the Religion Clauses" while funding here is
funding "to use recycled tires to resurface playgrounds").
180. Id. ("[O]nly a state interest 'of the highest order' can justify the
Department's discriminatory policy. Yet the Department offers nothing more

than Missouri's policy preference for skating as far as possible from religious
establishment concerns." (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978))).
181. See Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82
FORDHAm L. REV. 375, 378 (2013).

182.

Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2020 ("[T]he [McDaniel] Court struck

down under the Free Exercise Clause a Tennessee statute disqualifying ministers
from serving as delegates to the State's constitutional convention.").
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also disqualified ministers from legislative office." 183 These founding

era laws suggest that barring ministers from office was consistent
with the original understanding of free exercise.
Nevertheless,
despite the longstanding history behind these laws, the Trinity
Lutheran Court supported their rejection. 184 To explain its position,
the Court could have, for example, argued that states' original
practices and understandings did not inform the understanding of the
Federal Constitution-an originalist rebuttal. 185 But it did not.
Instead, the Court concluded, "[t]his historical tradition,however, did
not change the fact that the statute discriminated against McDaniel
by denying him a benefit solely because of his 'status as a
"minister.""186 What mattered was not the historical pedigree of the
practice, but the discrimination that resulted.1 87 Whatever the merit
of the Court's conclusion, it was not originalist.
The dismissive treatment of the original understanding of cash
payments to churches is surprising for at least two reasons. First, the
Trinity Lutheran decision "discounts centuries of history." 188 Second,
this "judicial brush aside" 189 runs contrary to the Court's repeated
assertions in Town of Greece that the Establishment Clause must be
interpreted in light of original understandings and practices.
B.

OriginalistAnalyses

What a more complete originalist analysis would look like may
well depend on the strand of originalism employed. The focus might
be on the intent of the Framers, such as James Madison, who was
pivotal in both early establishment debates and the drafting of the
Establishment Clause itself. 190
Or the focus might be on the
understanding of the Ratifiers as a whole or perhaps a hypothetical
reasonable citizen at the Founding. 191 Alternatively, perhaps the
Founding era is the wrong period, and the focus should be on the
Reconstruction period1 92 when the Fourteenth Amendment (which
incorporated the religion clauses) was adopted. 193 The question may

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Of course, one could also argue that the state constitutions from the
Founding reflect the general understanding of what free exercise did and did not
require.
186. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2020 (first emphasis added) (quoting
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 627 (1978)).
187. See id.
188. Id. at 2041 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

189. Id.
190.

See supra Subpart II.B.

191. See supra Subpart I.B.
192. See supra Subpart III.B.3.
193. See supra note 19 (explaining the incorporation of the Establishment
Clause via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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also be framed at different levels of generality: is it funding for church
playgrounds (which did not always exist), or funding for churches in
general, or perhaps funding for the structural upkeep of churches?
These, of course, are just some of the options.
A thorough investigation is beyond the scope of this Article, but I
will very briefly sketch out a few possible analyses below. They are
not conclusive, and indeed I doubt they ever could be when the exact
same materials have been interpreted differently even by those
employing a similar methodology. 194 Rather, this Subpart is meant
to provide a glimpse into the type of originalist historical examination
that has been brought to the question in cases and scholarship-and
that the Trinity Lutheran Court ignored.
1.

OriginalIntent of Framersand James Madison

I will start with an Old Originalism analysis of the intent of the
Framers of the U.S. Constitution. This approach probably best
approximates the one actually used by the Supreme Court in Town of
Greece and so represents the one providing the greatest consistency
across decisions.
Although a Federalist who did not believe constitutional
amendments were necessary, James Madison authored what
eventually became the Bill of Rights. 195 Madison was a prominent
figure in establishment controversies and known as the "Architect" or
194. Frank Guliuzza III, The PracticalPerils of an Original Intent-Based
JudicialPhilosophy: Originalism and the Church-State Test Case, 42 DRAKE L.
REV. 343, 381 (1993) (concluding that even scholars who consider themselves

originalists and looked at the same historical evidence surrounding the
Establishment Clause reach very different conclusions about original intent); cf.
Alan Brownstein, The Reasons Why OriginalismProvidesA Weak Foundationfor
InterpretingConstitutionalProvisions Relating to Religion, 2009 CARDozo L. REV.
DE NOVO 196, 197 (2009) (noting the wildly different conclusions reached by
"highly reputable scholars" on the original understanding of the religion clauses);
id. at 198 ("When there is this level of dissonance as to the nature of the original
understanding, choosing one historical account over another to resolve a religion
clause dispute does little to legitimate the conclusion being asserted.").
195. Federalists argued that amendments were unnecessary because
Congress had only the powers the Constitution granted it, and the Constitution
did not grant Congress the power to regulate religion. Kurt T. Lash, The Second
Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment
Principle, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1085, 1090 (1995) ("According to Madison in the
Virginia ratification debates, 'there is not a shadow of right in the general
government to intermeddle with religion. Its least interference with it, would be
a most flagrant usurpation."'). Nevertheless, Madison helped draft the first ten
amendments because several states would not ratify the new Constitution
without them. Suzanna Sherry, The Founders'Unwritten Constitution, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1161 (1987) ("[W]hen Rhode Island and North Carolina refused
to ratify, and Virginia and then New York submitted calls for a second
convention, the Federalists were forced to take seriously the demands for a bill
of rights, and James Madison took on the task of pushing a bill of rights through
Congress.").

646

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

"Father" of the Bill of Rights, 196 and his influence on the First
Amendment is undeniable. 197 Madison presumably would not draft a
clause that contravened his beliefs.1 98 So what were his beliefs?
Madison set forth his views on church-state relations in his

Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
("Memorial and Remonstrance").199
"The Memorial and
Remonstrance has rightly been termed 'probably the fullest and most
thoughtful exposition of the disestablishmentarian thinking at the
time of the Founding, as well as the reasoning of the principal author
of the Bill of Rights."' 200 The polemic was in response to a 1784
Virginia bill proposing a religious assessment that would be directed
to a church of the taxpayer's choosing. 20 1 Churches could use the
money "to pay for the salaries of their clergy, to provide places of
divine worship, and to 'none other use whatsoever.' 2 0 2
The
assessment bill was defeated, in part due the Memorial and

196. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection
of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977) (describing James Madison
as "Father of the Bill of Rights"); Joyce A. McCray Pearson, The Federaland State
Bills of Rights: A Historical Look at the Relationship Between America's
Documents of Individual Freedom, 36 How. L.J. 43, 58 (1993) (describing
Madison as "James Madison-Chief Architect of the Federal Bill of Rights").
197. See, e.g., David Reiss, Jefferson and Madisonas Icons in JudicialHistory:
A Study of Religion Clause Jurisprudence,61 MD. L. REV. 94, 175 (2002) (noting
"the key role played by Madison, who had an immense and independent influence
on the history of religious liberty and the enactment of the Constitution and the
Religion Clause of the First Amendment in particular").
198. Of course, there is no guarantee that the Establishment Clause perfectly
embodies Madison's beliefs either.
199. Madison, supra note 26.
200. Andy G. Olree, James Madison and Legislative Chaplains, 102 Nw. U. L.
REV. 145, 164 (2008) (quoting MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 51 (3d ed. 2011)); see also Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and
Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance,
87 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 785 (2002) (describing the Memorial and Remonstrance
as "the most powerful and influential statement of Madison's views on the subject
of religious liberty").
201. Patrick Henry, Transcript For: A Bill Establishing a Provision for
Teachers of the Christian Religion, MONTICELLO DIGITAL CLASSROOM,
https://classroom.monticello.org/view/72279/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2018). A reprint
of the Bill also appears as an appendix in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S.
1, 72-74 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The taxpayer could also direct their
assessment to a school fund for, as stated in the bill, "the encouragement of
seminaries of learning within the Counties whence such sums shall arise." Id. at
74.
202. Blasi, supranote 200, at 784 (quoting THOMAs E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND
STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776-1787 189 (1977)); see also id. at 819
("[T]he money to be raised by virtue of this Act, shall be by the Vestries, Elders,
or Directors of each religious society, appropriated to a provision for a Minister
or Teacher of the Gospel of their denomination, or the providing place of divine
worship, and to none other use whatsoever.").
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Remonstrance.20 3 Instead, with Madison's guidance, Virginia passed
the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, 204 which guaranteed that no
one would be forced to attend or financially support any religious
entity. 205
In his Memorial and Remonstrance,Madison lambasted taxpayer
subsidies to churches. Indeed, he argued that even three pence would
be too much. 2 0 6 He feared that a religious assessment would upset
the civil peace. 207 In fact, "[t]he very appearance of the Bill has
transformed that Christian forbearance, love and charity, which of
late mutually prevailed, into animosities and jealousies, which may
not soon be appeased."2 0 8
Madison also viewed religious assessments as a first step toward
the persecution and subordination of religious minorities. 209 In his
mind, the Spanish Inquisition differed only in degree, not in kind. 210
"The one is the first step, the other the last in the career of
intolerance." 2 11 Moreover, as mentioned earlier, even if government
support of some religions did not lead to the persecution of
nonadherents, it certainly made them second-class citizens. 212

203. Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the
Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 839, 854 (1986) ("Madison helped to defeat
Patrick Henry's bill, largely through his famous Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments.").
204. Id. ("Madison steered Jefferson's bill into law. Madison had to carry the
whole load, because Jefferson was in Paris in 1785.").
205. 82. A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, June 18, 1779, NAT'L
ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/JeffersonL/01-02-02-01320004-0082 (last visited Aug. 2, 2018) ("[N]o man shall be compelled to frequent
or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever."); see also id.
("[T]o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of
opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical.").
206. Madison, supra note 26, at ¶ 3 ("[I]t is proper to take alarm at the first
experiment on our liberties . . the same authority which can force a citizen to
contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one
establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases
whatsoever. . . .").
207. Id. at ¶ 11 ("[I]t will destroy that moderation and harmony which the
forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion has produced among its
several sects.").
208. Id.; see also id. ("What mischiefs may not be dreaded, should this enemy
to the public quiet be armed with the force of a law?").
209. Cf. Blasi, supra note 200, at 802 ("No fewer than five of the fifteen
paragraphs of the Memorial and Remonstrance make explicit appeals to
equality.").
210. Madison, supra note 26, at ¶ 9 ("Distant as it may be in its present form
from the Inquisition, it differs from it only in degree.").
211. Id.
212. Id. ("It degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions
in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority."). This thinking may
also explain why Madison wrote that legislative prayers violated the
Establishment Clause.
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Finally, Madison thought government-supported religion would
corrupt and degrade its beneficiaries: "experience witnesseth that
ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and
efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation." 213 In particular,
religious establishments have led to "pride and indolence in the
Clergy" and "ignorance and servility in the laity." 2 14
In short, Madison was no fan of state-funded churches and would
thus oppose, perhaps even vehemently, the Trinity Lutheran ruling.
At the same time, despite his preeminent role, Madison represents
only one Framer. 2 15 Moreover, one could argue his Memorial and
Remonstrance does not address exactly the same situation. 2 1 6
Madison was protesting funding to both clergy and churches (despite
the Trinity Lutheran Court's attempt to suggest otherwise), not
funding to the playgrounds of church schools.
Still, since the
playground is ultimately part of the church (and therefore "any
religious . . . place"), odds are Madison would oppose its funding as
well. Would Madison still insist on his separationist principles if the
funding was also made available to secular school playgrounds? 21 7
The tenor of the Memorial and Remonstrance, plus the fact that the

213. Id. at T 7.
214. Id. ("During almost fifteen centuries has the legal establishment of

Christianity been on trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all places,
pride and indolence in the Clergy, ignorance and servility in the laity, in both,

superstition, bigotry and persecution."). This view was shared by Evangelical
Christians. John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the
American Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 382 (1996)
("The evangelicals feared state benevolence towards religion and religious bodies
almost as much as they feared state repression. For those religious bodies that
received state benefits would invariably become beholden to the state, and
distracted from their divine mandates.").
215. See Carl H.
Esbeck, Protestant Dissent and the Virginia
Disestablishment, 1776-1786, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 51, 64 (2009) ("Although
Madison was certainly in the thick of things in New York City [where the First
Congress debated the Establishment Clause], his influence on others in the
House and Senate was not without bounds.").
216. The overwhelmingly Christian prayers in the Town of Greece did not
match up perfectly with the generally nonsectarian prayers of the Founding era,
yet this mismatch did not prevent the Supreme Court from equating them. One
could do the same here and claim that funding for churches and funding for
church school playgrounds are likewise similar enough to draw the same
conclusion.
217. Again, the context surrounding the Town of Greece prayers differed from
the context of the original prayers, yet the Town of Greece Court mostly ignored
it. See supra notes 91, 100-01 and accompanying text.
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assessments Madison fought against could be allocated to churches or
schools, 2 18 suggests he would. 219 But no one can say for sure. 220
2.

Original Public Understandingof Founding Generation

For New Originalists, the proper originalist project is not to
uncover the Framers' or Ratifiers' subjective understanding of the
Establishment Clause. 22 1 Rather, it is to reconstruct the objective
understanding of the reasonable citizen at the time of the clause's
framing. 222 The Framers'/Ratifiers' views may help inform this
inquiry, 2 23 but so would the everyday meaning of words as revealed
by contemporaneous dictionaries, public debates, correspondence,
treatises, cases, and other written material of the day. 2 2 4

218. See Madison, supra note 26.
219. Cf. Blasi, supranote 200, at 792 ("At no juncture in [Madison's] sustained
campaign against the General Assessment did he so much as imply that the
proper remedy might be a broadening of the class of beneficiaries.").

220. Brownstein, supra note 194, at 206 ("There is no way to faithfully and

accurately determine what the polity would have thought about either subsidies
or exemptions in a world transformed from a minimal state to a modern
[regulatory and welfare] government.").
221. See Colby, supra note 41, at 723-24 ("Thus, over time, the focus of the
originalist inquiry began to evolve again. Originalists began to speak of the
'original meaning' project in more objective terms: as a search for the original,
objective meaning of the text, thereby ostensibly evading the various subjectivitybased objections.").
222. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
223. Saikrishna B. Prakash, Unoriginalism's Law Without Meaning, 15
CONST. COMMENT. 529, 537 (1998) ("[W]hy do originalists extensively quote the
founding fathers? An originalist who draws conclusions from such statements is
not making claims about what all the framers or ratifiers thought. Rather, she
seeks to make sense of the text by surveying how its words were used in common
parlance. Indeed, the framers' or ratifiers' comments about a particular phrase
or provision are often a fairly good reflection of what that phrase or provision
commonly was understood to mean.").
224. Id. ("Likewise, other writings and contemporaneous dictionaries furnish
clues as to meanings.").
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As originally understood, the Establishment Clause arguably
had two components. 225 First, there was the federalism component. 226
The Establishment Clause confirmed that the federal government
had no authority over religion and guaranteed that the federal
government would not interfere with each state's religion policy. 2 2 7
This constraint would, for example, prevent the federal government
from dismantling state establishments. 228 Ultimately, however, this
federalism limit was superseded by the Fourteenth Amendment,
which fundamentally changed the relationship between the federal
government and the states. 229
Second, the Establishment Clause was also understood to contain
a substantive component. 2 30 The Establishment Clause was not, after
all, only about keeping the federal "nose" out of the states' business.
It also set a bar on establishing religion at the federal level. 2 3 1 It was
what prevented Congress from "establishing" a national church in

225. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Incorporation of the Establishment Clause
Against the States: A Logical, Textual, and HistoricalAccount, 88 IND. L.J. 669,
696 (2013) ('This disability generated two immunities, one held by the states
against federal interference in state decisions to establish or disestablish religion,
and one held by the people against the adverse legal consequences that would
flow from federal establishment of a national church."); Kent Greenawalt,
Common Sense About Original and Subsequent Understandingsof the Religion
Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479, 480 (2006) ("More particularly, the
Establishment Clause was, at its origins, both jurisdictional and substantive.").
Scholars disagree as to which is the primary purpose, some favoring the
federalism component and some the substantive one. Steven D. Smith, The
JurisdictionalEstablishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1843, 1844 (2006) ("The jurisdictional interpretation of the Establishment Clause
has been advocated in one or another version by prominent scholars including
Akhil Amar and Philip Hamburger and also, recently, by Justice Clarence
Thomas. But it has been opposed by other prominent scholars, including Douglas
Laycock, Kent Greenawalt, Noah Feldman, and Steven Green.").
226. See Greenawalt, supra note 225, at 483 (noting that the Establishment
Clause has a jurisdictional component).
227. Smith, supra note 225, at 1843 ("The basic idea is that the Framers of
the Establishment Clause . . . intended simply to reconfirm in writing the
jurisdictional arrangement that preexisted the Constitution and that no one
wanted to alter: this was an arrangement in which religion was a subject within
the domain of the states, not the national government.").
228. See id. at 1858 ("The basic idea . .. is that Congress and the states added
the Establishment Clause to the Constitution to confirm in writing the federalist
arrangement in which religion was within the jurisdiction of the states, not of the
national government.").
229. See supra Part III.B.3.
230. See Greenawalt, supra note 225 (noting that the Establishment Clause
also has a substantive component).
231. Id. at 498 ("[T]he notion that the First Amendment had no application to
territorial governance-that Congress could, in other words, gravely suppress
freedom of speech, the press, and religion in the territories without constitutional
qualm-is intrinsically much less plausible than the alternative.").
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federal establishment of religion prohibited by the Establishment
Clause? In particular, what did a reasonable, informed person from
the time period understand the Establishment Clause to mean vis-Avis federal funding of churches?
The answer may turn on whether the question is about "original
expected applications" or "original objective principles." 233 The goal
of an original expected application approach is to discover how the
Founding generation expected the Establishment Clause to apply to
government funding of churches and their playgrounds. An original
expected application analysis might consider whether the federal
government at the Founding in fact funded churches or church
playgrounds, on the assumption that actual practices reflected
(Then again, relying on
general constitutional understandings.
historical practices assumes that politicians are always mindful of
constitutional limits, whereas experience has taught us otherwise.) 234
In any event, the historical record cannot answer this precise
question. The federal government did not fund any churches, let
alone church playgrounds. On the other hand, the First Congress did
fund a chaplain for itself, as well as missionaries to convert Native
Americans. 235 In short, the historical record is inconclusive.
Examining how the word "establishment" was used may be more
helpful in an original expected application analysis of whether
taxpayer subsidies to churches and their school playgrounds was
understood to violate the Establishment Clause. 236 As it happens, at
the Founding era, "establishment" was associated with religious
taxes. 237 For example, Virginia's proposed religious assessment was
232. Id. at 486; see also id. at 489 ("[N]othing in the clauses themselves
indicates that they are irrelevant for federal domains.").
233. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
234. Laycock, supra note 135, at 913 ("The argument cannot be merely that
anything the Framers did is constitutional. The unstated premise of that
argument is that the Framers fully thought through everything they did and had
every constitutional principle constantly in mind, so that all their acts fit together
in a great mosaic that is absolutely consistent, even if modern observers cannot
That is not a plausible premise.");
understand the organizing principle.
Greenawalt, supranote 225, at 497 ("[E]ven legislation passed by Congress after
adoption did not necessarily reflect a considered view of its members about what
the religion clauses permitted.").
235. Witte, supra note 214, at 406-07 (noting that federal subsidies "were
given to Christian missionaries who proselytized among the native American
Indians").
236. At least it avoids "assum[ing] a degree of government attention and
fidelity to constitutional principles that is probably unwarranted." Brownstein,
supra note 194, at 204; see also id. ("Government officials are not always focusing
on the constitutional implications of their decisions. Moreover, they do not
always live up to their highest ideals, constitutional or otherwise.").

237. See Laycock, supra note 135, at 913 ("The state debates concerning
establishment centered on financial aid.").

-

federal territories. 2 32 The real question, then, is what amounts to
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referred to as an "establishment." 238 Perhaps, then, the state-funded
chaplain and missionaries were the anomaly, not the other way
around, so that to ban establishment was to ban taxing people in
support of churches (including church playgrounds). Then again,
"[t]he term 'establishment of religion' was a decidedly ambiguous
phrase-in the eighteenth century, as much as today." 239

The "original objective principles" approach would try to uncover
the original principles behind the Establishment Clause and then see
how those principles play out with government grants to churches. 24 0
A main principle accepted by all in the late eighteenth century was
liberty of conscience. 241 "Congregationalists, evangelicals, Anglicans,
and enlightened Deists alike asserted a belief in the liberty of
conscience .

.

. [and] the idea of liberty of conscience formed the

intellectual and theoretical underpinning of all discussions of free
exercise and establishment in the colonies and then the states."2 42
Freedom of conscience had many interrelated aspects in the
young republic, including voluntarism and disestablishment.
Voluntarism meant that religion ought to be a voluntary endeavor, 24 3
which naturally led to support for disestablishment. 244 "With respect
238. Id. at 904-05 ("[T]he word 'establishment' often was used in debates over
general assessments. Madison used 'establish,' 'established,' or 'establishment'
thirteen times in the Memorialand Remonstrance, and he described the general
assessment bill as 'the proposed establishment."').
239. Witte, supra note 214, at 401.
For example, for some people
establishment included any government scheme that imposed taxes for churches,
while for others it did not reach schemes that allowed taxpayers to choose their
church or opt out.
See Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the
Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 397-98 (2002) ('There was also a
live disagreement about whether nonpreferential funding of religion necessarily
violated liberty of conscience.").
240. See Whittington, supranote 40, at 611 ('The point [of originalist inquiry]
is to determine what principle. . . [the founders] adopted, and then to figure out
whether and how that principle applies to the current case.").
241. Witte, supra note 214, at 389 ("Liberty of conscience ... was universally
embraced in the young republic."); see also Feldman, supra note 239, at 374 ("[B]y
the late eighteenth century it was broadly agreed in the colonies that there was
a basic, indeed natural, right called 'liberty of conscience."').
242. Feldman, supra note 239, at 379.
243. Smith, supranote 225, at 1865 ("[T]here was consensus, at some level of
abstraction . . . about the voluntary character of religion."); see also Witte, supra
note 214, at 390 ("First, liberty of conscience protected voluntarism-'the right of
private judgment in matters of religion,' the unencumbered ability to choose and
to change one's religious beliefs and adherences.").
244. Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principleand Church Autonomy, Then
and Now, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1593, 1594-95 (2004) ("In every state liberty of
conscience and liberty of worship is complete.
The government extends
protection to all... . The proper civil authorities have nothing to do with the creed
of those who open a place of worship. . . . On the other hand, .. . neither the
general government nor that of the States does anything directly for the
maintenance of public worship.... [Religion relies] upon the efforts of its friends,
acting from their own free will." (alterations in original) (quoting ROBERT BAIRD,
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to money, religion was to be wholly voluntary. Churches either would
support themselves or they would not, but the government would
neither help nor interfere. That is what disestablishment meant to
the Framers in the context in which they thought about it."245
The reverse forcing people to financially support a religion not
their own-amounted to establishment. 2 4 6 Though people disagreed
about the outer limits of establishment, 247 they all agreed that
"[e]stablishment of religion ... often had the effect of compelling
conscience. Going beyond compulsory church attendance or required
forms of worship, the Framers' generation worried that conscience
would be violated if citizens were required to pay taxes to support
religious institutions with whose beliefs they disagreed." 248 In short,
no reasonable person of that era would dispute that it violated
freedom of conscience to be conscripted into financially supporting a
249
religion not one's own.

RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 287-88 (Edwin S. Gaustad

ed., Arno

Press & The New York Times 1969) (1844))).
245. Laycock, supra note 135, at 923.
246. Feldman, supra note 239, at 352 ("[Tlhe Framers cared mostly about

dissenters' liberty of conscience from paying taxes.").
247. Scholars also disagree about the extent of the disagreement. Compare

Green, supra note 51, at 776 ("Finally, most early Americans believed that
enforced tax support of one religion or of religion generally violated rights of
conscience."), with Feldman, supra note 239, at 416 ("There was broad agreement
that coercive taxes for religious purposes would, in principle, violate liberty of
conscience. But there was no agreement about whether it was coercive to collect
such taxes when the law provided for everyone to designate the religion of his
choice as the recipient of his taxes.").
248. Feldman, supra note 239, at 351; see also id. at 412 ("Establishment was
understood to be incompatible with liberty of conscience because it compelled
support for a church with which dissenters disagreed.").
249. Greenawalt, supra note 225, at 493 ("[T]he common belief in liberty of
conscience, including a right not to be forced to contribute to religion, underlies
the Establishment Clause."). How could this understanding be reconciled with
the fact that several states still had official religious establishments? Different
scholars have suggested different answers. One is that states could support
limits on federal establishments without endangering their own. See, e.g., id.
("Even they might well have wished that the federal government not undertake
an establishment in federal domains, given the risk that such a federal
establishment would not be to their liking."). Another is that state policy does
not inform the Federal Constitution. Laycock, supra note 135, at 878 ("Some of
the New England states provided financial aid to more than one church, but these
systems were preferential in practice and were the source of bitter religious strife.
There is no evidence that those schemes were the model for the establishment
clause."). Yet another is that only a few remained, and they were not considered
establishments because people could direct their payments to their own church:
"By the time of the drafting of the First Amendment, therefore, compelled
assessments for the support of religion existed in only three states and, in each
case, in the form of nonpreferential, multiple establishments." Green, supranote
51, at 780.
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How does this original public understanding
of the
Establishment Clause as barring coerced financial support of
churches square with the government's funding of Trinity Lutheran
Church and its church playground? Does it violate the principles of
the Establishment Clause? One could argue no, it is part of a broader
funding scheme to support playgrounds and the benefit to religion is
incidental. On the other hand, one could argue yes, it exemplifies the
type of establishment the Establishment Clause meant to prohibit:
people of all different religions are coerced into providing tax dollars
that are used to support a church not their own. 250 Moreover, this
funding scheme differs from the few remaining establishments of the
Founding era, which ensured that taxpayers were able to donate to
their own church or opt out. 25 1

Once again, a definitive answer is

elusive. 252
3.

OriginalPublic Understandingof Reconstruction Generation

Some scholars have argued that the Founding era is the wrong
time period to examine, especially for challenges to state laws. 2 5 3
After all, the Establishment Clause, like all of the protections listed
in the Bill of Rights, originally constrained only the federal
government. It is the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, that

250. Feldman, supra note 239, at 412 ("The history equally lends credence to
the view that government should not provide financial support to religious
institutions, either directly or indirectly, because doing so would require coercing
the conscience of dissenting taxpayers."); id. at 417-18 ("Even those Framers who
favored taxation in support of religion did so on the understanding that such
arrangements made provisions for dissenters to designate their taxes for a
recipient of their choice.").
251. Id. at 351 ("Even those who advocated government funding of religion
proposed that taxpayers be permitted to designate the denomination of their
choice to receive their taxes, or else opt out of paying those taxes altogether.").
252. See id. at 417 ("The point is that an accurate account of the intellectual
origins of the Establishment Clause does not, and cannot, provide a definitive
answer to the question of what exactly the Establishment Clause prohibited then
or prohibits now. The historical analysis does not get us all the way to a doctrinal
answer."). Note too that when the principles do not cleanly point to one answer,
as here, the analysis has arguably moved into constitutional "construction."
253. Greenawalt, supra note 225, at 503-04 ("If what should count in
interpretation is original understanding, we cannot ignore understanding at the
time of the Fourteenth Amendment ... . In light of suggestions by Lash and
Amar, among others, that the prevailing views of both free exercise and
nonestablishment were more expansive in the mid-nineteenth century than in
the late eighteenth century, any serious originalist must grapple with how free
exercise and nonestablishment were regarded in the mid-nineteenth century.");
Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 984
(2012) ("[F]or an originalist who believes Barron v. Baltimore was correctly
decided, it is difficult to understand why the original understanding of the Bill of
Rights ever should, in itself, control a constitutional case involving state and local
action.").
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applies establishment limits to state governments. 254 Therefore, the
(New Originalism) question ought to be: What did the Establishment
25 5
Clause mean to the reasonable person of the Reconstruction era?
Even if the Establishment Clause had been primarily motivated
by federalism concerns (as some scholars argue), by the
Reconstruction era, the Establishment Clause had evolved from its
federalism roots to cover individual freedoms-namely freedom from
religion. 256 In other words, by Reconstruction, people interpreted the
Establishment Clause to express the principle of nonestablishment at
both the state and federal level. 2 57
That the Establishment Clause was generally understood to
guarantee federal and state disestablishment does not answer the
question of whether disestablishment barred state funding of
However, unlike the
churches or church school playgrounds.
debate regarding the
saw
era
Reconstruction
the
era,
Founding
funding of church schools, which presumably would include their
playgrounds. In particular, a constitutional amendment proposed in
Congress would have specifically barred government funding of
258
sectarian schools.

254. See supra note 19 (explaining incorporation). It is beyond the scope of
this Article to address the claim that the Establishment Clause cannot be
incorporated. Justice Thomas, for example, argues that because the original
point of the Establishment Clause was to provide protection for the states against
federal meddling, it cannot logically be applied againstthe states. See, e.g., Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("[The Establishment Clause ... protects state establishments from
federal interference but does not protect any individual right. These two features
independently make incorporation of the Clause difficult to understand."). Even
if it were true, "[t]he problem with this argument is that it assumes that the
Establishment Clause meant the same thing in 1868 that it did in 1789." Lash,

supra note 195, at 1099.
255. Greene, supra note 253, at 979 ("An originalist who believes that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated against state governments some or all of
the rights protected by the Bill of Rights should, in adjudicating cases under
incorporated provisions, be concerned primarily (if not exclusively) with
determining how the generation that ratified that amendment understood the
scope and substance of the rights at issue.").
256. Lash, supra note 195, at 1135 ("In this way, the Establishment Clause
came to represent a personal freedom. Over time, popular interpretation of the
Clause focused not on the principle of federalism, but on the principle of
'nonestablishment."').
257. Id. ("[B]y Reconstruction most people interpreted the Establishment

Clause to express the principle of nonestablishment."); id. at 1141 (noting "the
reinterpretation of the Establishment Clause at both a state and federal level to

express a principle of personal freedom-the immunity from government power
of the subject of religion.").
258. H.R.J. Res. 1, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875).
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The Blaine Amendment was introduced by Representative James
Blaine of Maine in 1875, six years after the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified. 2 59 It stated:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money
raised by taxation in any State for the support of public schools,
or derived from any public fund therefore, nor any public lands
devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious
sect, nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be
divided between religious sects or denominations. 260
The proposed amendment thus did two things: it explicitly applied
the religion clauses to the states, and it expressly barred state
funding to any religious institution. 26 1 While the Blaine Amendment
ultimately failed at the federal level, 2 6 2 at least three quarters of the
states (including Missouri 263) have similar limits in their own
constitutions. 264
Unfortunately, it is not clear how the proposal and defeat of the
Blaine Amendment illuminate the Reconstruction understanding of
the Establishment Clause. 265 On the one hand, it could be argued
that if the Establishment Clause were already understood to prohibit
funding for religious schools, then the Blaine Amendment would be
unnecessary. 2 66 On the other hand, it could be argued that the Blaine
Amendment embodied the contemporaneous understanding of

&

259. Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine
Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARv. J.L.
PUB. POL'Y 551, 556 (2003).
260. Id. (quoting H.R.J. Res. 1).
261. H.R.J. Res. 1.
262. DeForrest, supra note 259, at 573 ("[The Blaine Amendment vote] was
short of the necessary two-thirds majority for passage and submission to the

states, killing the proposed amendment to the federal Constitution.").
263. Missouri's no-aid provisions precedes the Blaine Amendment. Id. at
327-28 ("Forty-five percent of the state no-funding provisions were drafted before
the debate over the Blaine Amendment.").
264. Steven K. Green, The Insignificance of the Blaine Amendment, 2008
B.Y.U. L. REV. 295, 327 (2008) ("Counts may vary, but thirty-eight states have
express provisions limiting or prohibiting public funding to religious schools (by
whatever name) and/or prohibiting control of the education fund by a religious
entity.").

265.

Indeed, different conclusions might be drawn from both its proposal and

its defeat.
266. Noah Feldman argues that the Blaine Amendment was politically
motivated and was meant to serve a wedge issue against Democrats. Noah
Feldman, Non-Sectarianism Reconsidered, 18 J.L. & POL. 65, 97 (2002) ("By
proposing a national constitutional amendment to prohibit states from funding
'sectarian' schools, Republicans would put Democrats in a tight spot."). However,
the motives of the Amendment's sponsors may or may not influence how a
reasonable Reconstruction era person would construe the Establishment Clause.
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disestablishment 267 and was meant to ensure that it was both
memorialized in writing 268 and applied to the states. 269
Many critics have argued that the latter understanding should
be discredited because it was primarily motivated by nativist animus
The Supreme Court itself has
toward Catholic immigrants. 270
to aid to pervasively sectarian
"hostility
that
previously argued
27
1
arising from the era's "pervasive
pedigree"
schools has a shameful
and
Catholics in general," 272 and
Church
Catholic
hostility to the
accordingly the Court "[did] not hesitate to disavow it."273
There are two problems with this argument. First, the claim may
be
accurate. 274 While scholars do not deny the era's anti-Catholic
not
267. Green, supra note 264, at 324 (concluding, after multiple cites to the
Congressional Record, that "the Blaine Amendment was not proposed to refine
or expand a constitutional principle"); cf. id. at 310 ("Funding of religious
education violated nonestablishment in three ways, according to contemporaries:
it violated rights of conscience to force one person to pay for another's religious
instruction; it would bring about religious dissension over the competition for
funds; and it would result in ecclesiastical control over public monies." (citing
William T. Harris, The Division of School Funds for Religious Purposes, 38
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 171, 173-74 (1876)).

&

268. Id. at 326 ("Although most states lacked express no-funding provisions
as of 1876, the consensus already was that such funding violated constitutional
principles. Chiefly, the Blaine Amendment would have constitutionalized the
status quo."). The original Ten Amendments arguably did much the same thing.
269. Even if the Blaine Amendment merely articulated the Reconstruction
understanding of disestablishment, the 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases' evisceration
of the privileges and immunities clause (meant to incorporate the Bill of Rights)
raised questions about its application to the states. See generally SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 78 (1872) ("Having shown that the privileges and
immunities relied on in the argument are those which belong to citizens of the
States as such, and that they are left to the State governments for security and
protection, and not by this article placed under the special care of the Federal
government. . . .").
270. Green, supra note 264, at 296 ("Critics have used the religious bigotry
associated with the Blaine Amendment to discredit these state facsimiles and the
no-funding principle they represent.").
271. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000).
272. Id.; see also Kyle Duncan, Secularism's Laws: State Blaine Amendments
and Religious Persecution, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 504 (2003) (noting that the
numerous and poor Catholic immigrants were "easy targets for discrimination by
the 'nativist' Protestant population").
273. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828.
274. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, More or Less Bunk: The Establishment Clause
Answers That History Doesn't Provide, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1617, 1618 (2004) ("As
for Justice Thomas's citation to anti-Catholic discrimination as the impetus for
resistance to government financing of religion, he failed to note the abundant
evidence of nondiscriminatory opposition to such financing."); Steven K. Green,
The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 38, 54 n.103 (1992)
("Evidence exists to substantiate Blaine's lack of personal animosity toward
Catholics. His mother was Catholic and his daughters were educated in Catholic
boarding schools."); Mary Jane Morrison, Dictionaries,Newspapers, and "Blaine
Amendments" in State Constitutionsin the 21st Century, 7 U. ST. THOMAS J.L.
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sentiments, they do contest its determinative role in opposing
government appropriations to religious institutions. 275 "[A]longside
the very real, politically charged anti-Catholicism of the Blaine
Amendment movement, that movement also represented an attempt
to institutionalize and constitutionalize a principled nonsectarian
model for separation of church and state." 276 In fact, many state
versions of the Blaine Amendment-like Missouri's, which was
Second, anti-Catholic
readopted in 1945-are free of taint. 277
sentiment may not be relevant for an originalist interpretation. It is
generally not a tenet of originalism to apply only those original
understandings we approve. 278 Quite the contrary: "[p]ractices and
understandings that were 'born of bigotry' are just as relevant and
binding as those that reflect more noble sentiments." 279 Accordingly,
even if the fixed meaning was informed by values our society no
longer holds, the meaning is nevertheless still fixed. 280
This brief review brings us no closer to a definite answer, but it
does leave open the possibility that the Establishment Clause, as
understood in Reconstruction, forbids government subsidies (whether
state or federal) to religious schools, as there could be no guarantee
that the government is not forcing taxpayers to subsidize religions not
their own. In short, as with the original understanding of the

PUB. POL'Y 204, 219 (2013) ("The best evidence of what the drafters and ratifiers

of Blaine clauses meant is what they said; in all but five state constitutions, they
used words that apply to all religious schools or all private schools [not just
Catholic or 'sectarian' ones].").
275. Green, supra note 264, at 296 ("The Blaine Amendment had as much to
do with the partisan climate of the post-Reconstruction era and related concerns
about federal power over education as it did with Catholic animus. Included in
the mix was a sincere effort to make public education available for children of all
faiths and races, while respecting Jeffersonian notions of church-state
separation.
Those who characterize the Blaine Amendment as a singular
exercise in Catholic bigotry thus give short shrift to the historical record and the
dynamics of the times.").
276. Feldman, supra note 266, at 68; see also id. ("This ideal was certainly
informed by Protestants' fear and hatred of what they believed was official
Catholic doctrine on church and state, but the non-sectarian ideal was also
associated

with

a

positive

commitment

to

voluntarism

in

religious

organization.").
277. See Aaron E. Schwartz, Dusting off the Blaine Amendment: Two
Challenges to Missouri'sAnti-Establishment Tradition, 73 Mo. L. REV. 129, 15767 (2008); see also id. at 131-32 ("Little evidence links the 1875 Missouri Blaine
Amendment with the anti-Catholic bigotry often associated with the failed
National Blaine Amendment and Blaine Amendments in other states. Even less
evidence of religious bigotry is available for the Blaine Amendment readopted in
Missouri's 1945 constitution.").
278. If originalism did screen for unsuitable motives, I wonder what
investigation of Congress's willingness to have almost exclusively Protestant
chaplains would turn up?

279. Brownstein, supra note 194, at 204.
280. See id.
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of the
era, the original public understanding
Founding
a
different
dictate
might
Clause
Establishment
era
Reconstruction
outcome in Trinity Lutheran Church.
V. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court is a fair-weather originalist. Sometimes it
insists on an originalist approach, as it did in Town of Greece.
Sometimes it more or less ignores an originalist approach, as it did in
Trinity Lutheran Church. This disparate treatment cannot be
explained by the longevity of the practice, since both decisions
addressed practices that date to the Founding. In Town of Greece,
just about any nonoriginalist approach to the Establishment Clause
would have resulted in a contrary outcome. It is harder to confidently
make a parallel assertion-that an originalist approach would have
resulted in a contrary outcome-regarding Trinity Lutheran Church,
given the scholarly disagreement. But chances are, it too would have
come out differently had the Court applied the same kind of
originalism as it did in Town of Greece. Given that the use of
originalism-or the failure to use it-may dictate the outcome of the
case, this inconsistency is suspect.

